Using estimable concepts, this paper provides sufficient conditions for third-degree price discrimination to raise or lower aggregate output, social welfare, and consumer surplus under differentiated oligopoly when all discriminatory markets are open even without price discrimination. Specifically, we permit general demand functions and cost differences across separate markets, and show that our sufficient conditions entail a cross-market comparison of multiplications of two or three of the following key endogenous variables with economic interpretation:pass-through value,market power index, and markup value. Notably, our results based on these "sufficient statistics" can readily be extended to allow heterogeneous firms, suggesting that they would be used as a building block for empirical study of third-degree price discrimination and welfare. price discrimination. Specifically, we permit general demand functions and cost differences across separate markets, and show that our sufficient conditions entail a cross-market comparison of multiplications of two or three of the following key endogenous variables with economic interpretation: pass-through value, market power index, and markup value. Notably, our results based on these "sufficient statistics" can readily be extended to allow heterogeneous firms, suggesting that they would be used as a building block for empirical study of third-degree price discrimination and welfare.
Introduction
This paper explores welfare effects of third-degree price discrimination in oligopoly as well as its output implications and the effects on consumer surplus. Specifically, we consider a fairly general setting, and present sufficient conditions for oligopolistic third-degree price discrimination to raise or lower aggregate output, consumer surplus, and Marshallian social welfare (i.e., the sum of consumer and producer surplus) when all discriminatory markets are served even without price discrimination. Our analysis is firstly developed under firm symmetry, and then is extended to allow heterogeneous firms in a natural manner. In addition, our analysis permits a moderate amount of cost differences across separate markets. These features, together with the fact that our sufficient conditions are stated in terms of estimable concepts (see below), are appealing because they allow greater flexibility that can accommodate with empirical studies.
Under third-degree price discrimination, consumers are segmented into separate markets and are charged different unit prices according to identifiable characteristics (e.g., age, occupation, and location or time of purchase). In contrast, all consumers face the same price if third-degree price discrimination is not practiced ("uniform pricing") . Without loss of generality, one can consider the case of two markets to understand how price discrimination changes output and welfare in each market. Furthermore, for a simpler exposition, all firms are symmetric and thus the prevailing price is identical. Then, in one market, the discriminatory price will become greater than the uniform price, whereas the unit price in the other market decreases. In Robinson's (1933) terminology, the former market is called a "strong" market (s), and the latter a "weak" market (w). Stated differently, the discriminatory price in the strong market p s is higher than the equilibrium uniform price, p, but p w , the discriminatory price in the weak market, is lower: p s > p > p w .
1
Given this price change, price discrimination raises output and social welfare in the weak market, whereas they lower in the strong market. Then, what are the overall effects? Our sufficient conditions for oligopolistic price discrimination to raise or lower aggregate output, social welfare, and consumer surplus are provided in a way of a cross-market comparison of multiplications of two or three of the following economic concepts: (i) pass-through value, or simply pass-through (ρ > 0), i.e., how the price responds to a small change in the marginal cost;
1 In this paper, price discrimination is present when p s > p w , i.e., when the prices across markets are not uniform. As Clerides (2004, p. 402) states, once cost differentials are allowed, "there is no single, widely accepted definition of price discrimination." To understand this, consider symmetric firms and let mc s and mc w be marginal costs at equilibrium output in markets s and w, respectively. Then, there can be two alternative definitions. One is the margin definition: price discrimination occurs when p s − mc s > p w − mc w . The other one is the markup definition due to Stigler (1987) : price discrimination occurs when p s /mc s > p w /mc w . Our simpler definition is in line with the former definition, and is employed for its tractability and its connectivity to the existing literature on third-degree price discrimination with no cost differentials. Moreover, our definition of price discrimination coincides with what Chen and Schwartz (2015) and Chen, Li and Schwartz (2019) call "differential pricing." As long as cost differentials are sufficiently small, these differences will not alter the results significantly because these three definitions are equivalent if mc s = mc w .
(ii) market power index, or simply market power (θ ∈ [0, 1]), which measures the intensity of competition in the market; and (iii) markup value, or simply markup (µ ≥ 0), which is simply the difference between the price and the marginal cost. In particular, in a series of propositions, we show that the product of market power and pass-through, θρ, is important for determining the output effects, whereas the product of all the three concepts, θµρ, consists of the sufficient condition for a welfare change. Intuitively, the product of market power and pass-through measures how output in each separate market changes in response to a marginal change in price. To evaluate a marginal change in welfare, one needs to consider the markup, which measures welfare gain or loss in response to a marginal change in quantity under imperfect competition where the price exceeds the marginal cost. In this way, welfare implications are obtained from a cross-market comparison of the quantity change multiplied by the markup. For the effects on consumer surplus, the product of markup and pass-through, µρ, is crucial because it measures the price change multiplied by the amount of output.
We also emphasize that these three concepts consists of the "sufficient statistics" (Chetty 2009 ) in the sense that no other information is necessary (except for the information for an adjustment; see the explanation in the end of subsection 3.1) and that they are sufficient to determine the output and welfare effects of oligopolistic third-degree price discrimination. Furthermore, pass-through is determined by up to the second-order demand characteristics, and under a game of price setting, market power is expressed by the own-and cross-price elasticities. Obviously, markup is also determined by the own-and cross-price elasticities via the first-order conditions. Thus, once the market demands are specified/estimated, a change in aggregate output, social welfare, or consumer surplus is predicted by computing these "sufficient statistics." For this sake, the researcher does not have to directly compare welfare under price discrimination and that under uniform pricing. In this way, our theoretical predictions, equipped with an estimable framework, would be utilized to understand the mechanism behind an empirical result. For example, in their empirical analysis of within-store brand competition, Hendel and Nevo (2013) show that social welfare is higher under third-degree price discrimination than with the case of no discrimination. However, it is not clear which factor is important in obtaining this empirical result. Although ultimately welfare evaluation is an empirical matter, one still wishes to know more about which force derives the result. Therefore, this paper also aims to fill the gap between the theoretical predictions and the empirical literature on price discrimination where researchers are often agnostic about the mechanism behind the result.
2
The literature on third-degree price discrimination has a centennial tradition, pioneered by Pigou (1920) and Robinson (1933) , with the main focus being on whether price discrimination raises or lowers social welfare. Among others, Schmalensee (1981) and Aguirre, Cowan, and Vickers (2010) study how the demand curvatures are related to the output and welfare effects. In addition to competition being imperfect, third-degree price discrimination entails further inefficiency in production and distribution as consumers with the same marginal valuation may face different prices simply because they belong to different markets. Thus, for thirddegree price discrimination to raise social welfare, it must expand aggregate output sufficiently to offset such a misallocation across markets. Schmalensee (1981) shows that an increase in aggregate output is a necessary condition for third-degree price discrimination to raise social welfare-generalized by Varian (1985) and Schwartz (1990)-and Aguirre, Cowan, and Vickers (2010) identify that aggregate output increases with price discrimination if the inverse demand curvature is greater ("more convex") in the weak market than in the strong market, and that with an additional qualification (the discriminatory prices are sufficiently close), social welfare also increases.
However, these studies analyze monopolistic third-degree discrimination, and to date, "there are virtually no predictions as to how discrimination impacts welfare" (Hendel and Nevo 2013, p. 2723 ; emphasis added) once oligopolistic competition is taken into account. For example, Holmes (1989) employs the same technique used by Schmalensee (1981) and Aguirre, Cowan and Vickers (2010) (see Section 3 for details) to study the output effects of third-degree price discrimination in a symmetric oligopoly. However, Holmes (1989) provides no welfare predictions (see also Dastidar 2006) .
3 In this paper, we aim to contribute to this literature by providing fairly general conditions as to whether oligopolistic price discrimination raises or lowers aggregate output, social welfare, and consumer surplus. Our results generalize Aguirre, Cowan, and Vickers' (2010) analysis of monopolistic third-degree price discrimination not only because we study oligopoly but because our results are also stated in terms of the sufficient statistics. Although these sufficient statistics themselves are endogenous variables and thus are less fundamental than demand primitives such as the first-and second-order characteristics (i.e., elasticities and curvatures), our focus on the sufficient statistics enables us to extend our results under firm symmetry to the case of heterogeneous firms (both in demand and production). In addition, we also provide another expression for Holmes ' (1989) derivation of the output effects in terms of the key statistics. Furthermore, our treatment also allows differences in the marginal cost across separate markets. In almost all of the theoretical studies on price discrimination, researchers (somewhat manually) assume that there are no cost differentials across discriminatory markets to focus on the demand side. However, in many real cases of price discrimination, cost differentials are quite often observed, not to mention the typical example of freight charges across regional markets with different costs of transportation and storage (Phlips 1983, pp. 5-7) . In the narrow definition of price discrimination, this is not price discrimination because they are regarded as different products. However, airlines are arguably motivated to offer different types of seats mainly because they aim to make use of heterogeneity among consumers. Thus, ideally, a theoretical analysis on price discrimination should also allow a moderate amount of cost differentials across discriminatory markets.
Even if costs differ across markets, sellers, in reality, may have to be engaged in uniform pricing due to the universal service requirement, fairness concerns from consumers, and so on (Okada 2014; Geruso 2017 ). In the case of monopoly with differentials in the marginal costs across markets, Chen and Schwartz (2015) derive sufficient conditions for consumer surplus to be higher under differential pricing.
4 To ensure that the strong market is indeed strong when cost differentials are allowed, it is sufficient to assume that the marginal cost in the strong market, denoted by mc s , is higher than that in the weak market: mc s > mc w (though mc s should not be too much higher than mc w ). Then, under uniform pricing, the markup in the strong market p − mc s is smaller than the markup in the weak market p − mc w . Differential pricing allows the monopolist to sell more products in the weak market, which is improves efficiency. Chen and Schwartz (2015) find that while differential pricing with no cost differentials (third-degree price discrimination in a traditional manner) tends to increase the average price after differential pricing is allowed, differential pricing with cost differentials does not. In contrast, our analysis provides welfare implications in a more direct manner. As in Chen and Schwartz (2015) , this paper does not have to make an explicit assumption on mc s and mc w as long as the second-order conditions for profit maximization are satisfied and a large discrepancy between mc w and mc w does not change the order of the discriminatory prices from the one with no cost differentials.
5
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents our basic model of oligopolistic pricing with symmetric firms and constant marginal costs. Then, we derive output and welfare implications in Section 3. We also provide parametric examples, show the results of the effects on consumer surplus, and discuss the case of non-marginal costs. In Section 4, we argue that our method can be readily extended if firm heterogeneity is introduced. Section 5 concludes the paper.
For ease of exposition, we, following Holmes (1989) and Aguirre, Cowan, and Vickers (2010) , consider the case of two symmetric firms and two separate markets or consumer groups (simply called markets hereafter). Extending the following analysis to the case of J (≥ 3) symmetric firms and M (≥ 3) separate markets is straightforward. As explained above, we call one market s (strong), where the equilibrium discriminatory price will be higher than the equilibrium uniform price, and the other w (weak), where the opposite is true. Two firms, A and B, have an identical cost structure in each market. Specifically, each firm has an identical cost function, c m (q jm ), in market m = s, w, where q jm is firm j's output (j = A, B). For simplicity of exposition below, we assume, with abuse of notation, that firms have a constant marginal cost in each market m, c m ≥ 0; here, in the spirit of Chen and Schwartz (2015) , c s and c w can be different. However, none of our arguments crucially hinges on this assumption (see Subsection 3.5).
In market m = s, w, given firms A and B's prices p Am and p Bm , the representative consumer consumes q Am > 0 and q Bm > 0, and her (net) utility is quasi-linear and is written as U m (q Am , q Bm ) − p Am q Am − p Bm q Bm , where U m is three-times continuously differentiable, ∂U m /∂q jm > 0, ∂ 2 U m /∂q 2 jm < 0, j = A, B, and ∂ 2 U m /(∂q Am ∂q Bm ) < 0. Direct demands in market m are derived from the representative consumer's utility maximization: ∂U m (q jm , q −j,m )/∂q jm −p jm = 0, which leads to firm j's demand in market m, q jm = x jm (p jm , p −j,m ). We assume that x jm is twice continuously differentiable. The corresponding inverse demand can be written as p jm = p jm (q jm , q −j,m ). Because of the assumptions on the utility, firm j's demand in market m falls as its own price increases (∂x jm /∂p jm < 0 and ∂p jm /∂x jm < 0), and it rises as the rival's price increases (∂x jm /∂p −j,m > 0 and ∂p jm /∂x −j,m < 0; the firms' products are substitutes). We assume that for a consumer's perspective firms are symmetric: U m (q , q ) = U m (q , q ) for any q > 0 and q > 0. Then, the firms' demands in market m are also symmetric: x Am (p , p ) = x Bm (p , p ) for any p > 0 and p > 0. Because the firms' technologies are also identical, we, throughout this paper, focus on symmetric Nash equilibrium. Therefore, we define the demand in symmetric pricing by q m (p) ≡ x Am (p, p). Another interpretation of q m (p) is: both firms take 2q m (p) as the joint demand, "cooperatively" choose the same price (behaving as an "industry"), and divide the joint demand equally to obtain q m (p). Note that: 
This exchangeability is key in Holmes' (1989) derivation below. Intuitively, under symmetry, each firm treats the industry demand q m (p) as if it is its own demand. Thus, how a firm's pricing behavior affects its own demand as an industry demand has the following two effects: a small decrease in p A by firm A by deviating from the "coordinated" price p (i) not only raises its own demand by ∂x Am /∂p A as the residual monopolist (taking the rival's pricing as fixed; intrinsic effects), (ii) firm A can now also obtain some of the consumers originally attached to firm B, and this amount is ∂x Bm /∂p A (strategic effects).
Under symmetric pricing, we are able to define, following Holmes (1989, p. 245) , the price elasticity of the industry's demand by ε
. This corresponds to D in Weyl and Fabinger (2013, p. 542) , and it should not "be confused with the elasticity of the residual demand that any of the firms faces." Similarly, the own-price and the cross-price elasticities of the firm's demand are defined by ε Holmes (1989) shows that under symmetric pricing, ε
holds. This implies that the own-price elasticity must be greater than the cross-price elasticity (ε
2 j can be positive, zero or negative. Following Dastidar's (2006, p. 234 ) Assumption 2 (iv), we assume that Dastidar's (2006, pp. 235-6 ) Assumptions 3 and 4, for the existence and the global uniqueness of pricing equilibrium under either uniform pricing or price discrimination, we assume that for each firm j = A, B, ∂ 2 π jm /∂p Dastidar's (2006) Lemmas 1 and 2 for the existence and the uniqueness). We then define the first-order partial derivative of the profit in market m, evaluated at a symmetric price p, by 
8,9
The equilibrium discriminatory price in market m = s, w, p * m , satisfies the following Lerner formula: ε On the other hand, case (ii) is where the competitive pressure from other industries is weak, although inside the industry, firms are fiercely competing for consumers. For example, uniform pricing, firm j's quantity-setting problem is formulated as max qs,qw m=s,w [p jm (q jm , q −j,m )q jm − c m (q jm ) subject to p j,s (q j,s , q −j,s ) = p j,w (q j,w , q −j,w ).
7 Note that q w (p) > q w (p * s ) because q w (·) is strictly decreasing and p * s > p. By Assumption, q w (p * s ) > 0. Thus, the weak market is open under uniform pricing, i.e., q w (p) > 0. Alternatively, we would be able to show that there exist c s and c s , c s < c s , such that p * s > p * w and q w (p) > 0 for c s ∈ (c s , c s ) in a similar spirit of Adachi and Matsushima (2014) .
8 However, see Nahata, Ostaszewski, and Sahoo (1990) for an example of all discriminatory prices being lower than the uniform price with a plausible demand structure under monopoly. In the case of oligopoly, Corts (1998) show that best-response asymmetry, by which firms differ in ranking strong and weak markets, is necessary for all discriminatory prices to be lower than the uniform price ("all-out price competition"). As long as symmetric firms are considered, this case never arises. When firm heterogeneity is allowed in Section 4 below, we assume away best-response asymmetry throughout. In addition, if price discrimianation is allowed, each firm may not price discriminate even if it is allowed to do so because it is still able to set an uniform price (i.e., it is not forced to price discriminate). We assume that π jm (·, p * −j,m ) is strictly increasing (decreasing) at p jm = p in market m = s (m) and thus firm j has an incentive to deviate from the equilbrium uniform price if the other firm chooses p * −j,s and p * −j,w , and that π jm (·, p * −j,m ) attains the global optimum at p jm = p * jm . 9 Here, the only policy instrument is an enforcement of uniform pricing. Cowan (2018) studies a model of monopoly to consider a more moderate instrument by which a government regulates the monopolist's profit margins or price-marginal cost ratios across different markets.
10 In the demand construction based on random utility and discrete choice, this would be interpreted as an outside option. Note also that if the industry is defined by the SSNIP ("Small but Significant and Non-transitory Increase in Price") test, then by definition, ε is close to zero) because consumers want to get perfectly refreshed: having water instead of soda does not relieve their throat. From a firm's perspective, these two polar cases are equivalent with respect to pricing in the sense that if it raises its price by even a small amount, it loses a large number of consumers: whether they leave the industry or switch to rivals' products does not matter to that firm. Thus, in the examples above, the firms' (discriminatory) prices are close to marginal cost both in a residential area and in a resort due to different reasons. Recall again that these are two polar cases: in reality, ε Next, let y m be per-firm (symmetric) share output in market m,
12 In the rest of the paper, the dependence of the equilibrium price is often implicit when there are no confusions. In particular, the superscript star denotes price discrimination, whereas the upper bar uniform pricing. For example, we use (ε
as the industry's elasticities in equilibrium.
Output and Welfare
In the analysis below, we, following Schmalensee (1981) , Holmes (1989) , and Aguirre, Cowan, and Vickers (2010) , add the constraint p s − p w ≤ r, where r > 0, to the firms' profit maximization problem (under symmetric pricing).
13 Then, r = 0 corresponds to uniform pricing, and
w to price discrimination. We express social welfare (and aggregate output) as a function of r in [0, r * ]. Note that under this constrained problem of profit maximization,
Thus, we write the solution by p w (r). Then, we define p s (r) ≡ p w (r) + r. Applying the implicit function theorem to this equation yields to 11 Of course, the total output in market m is 2q m (p m ), aggregated across two symmetric firms.
12 If there are no cost differentials, i.e., c s = c w (≡ c), then the formula is simpler: m=s,w x m ε F m (p)(p−c)/p = 1 as shown by Holmes (1989, p. 247) : the markup rate (common to all markets) is equal to the inverse of the average of own-price elasticities weighted by the output shares.
13 Alternatively, Vickers (2017) analyzes properties of functions of social welfare or consumer surplus value as a scalar argument to compare social welfare or consumer surplus under price discrimination and uniform pricing in monopoly. Vickers (2017) especially focuses on the cases when the quantity elasticity or the inverse demand curvature is constant for all markets. See also Cowan (2017) for an analysis of the role of the price elasticity and the demand curvature in determining the effects of monopolistic third-degree price discrimination.
Here, note that π m (p) and ∂ 2 p π m (p) are different:
which corresponds to Aguirre, Cowan, and Vickers' (2010, p. 1603 ) π m (p). We assume that π m (p) < 0 for all p ≥ 0.
14 We define the representative consumer's utility in symmetric pricing by U m (q) = U m (q, q). Aggregate output under symmetric pricing is given by
Social welfare under symmetric pricing as a function of r is written as 
Output
Now, we can further proceed:
This derivation coincides with the case of monopoly as shown in Aguirre, Cowan and Vickers' (2010, p. 1604 ) equality (3) if there are no cost differentials (i.e., c s = c w ≡ c), with 14 Appendix A of Aguirre, Cowan and Vickers (2010) discusses the concavity of the profit function.
15 As already noted, we consider one strong market and one weak market. More generally, by defining S ≡ {m|p * m > p} and W ≡ {m|p > p * m }, p s (r), s ∈ S, and p w (r), w ∈ S, consists of the optimal price vector under constraints |p m −p| ≤ r for all m ∈ S∪W , with r ∈ [0, max m |p * m −p|]. Then, for example, social welfare is defined as W (r; c s , c w )
Clearly, our two-market analysis does not lose any validity. two minor modifications: (i) the left hand side is W (r)/2 rather than W (r) itself, and (ii) the last term of Aguirre, Cowan and Vickers' (2010) equality (3) is replaced by Q (r)/2 rather than Q (r) because (1/2) m=s,
If cost differentials are allowed, it is observed that an increase in the weighted aggregate output,
, is necessary for price discrimination to raise social welfare, as in the case of monopoly.
16,17
To proceed further, we define the curvature of the firm's (direct) demand in market m by
(which measures the convexity/concavity of the firm's direct demand, and corresponds to α m (p) in Aguirre, Cowan and Vickers 2010, p. 1603) , and the elasticity of the cross-price effect of the firm's direct demand in market m by
which is new to oligopoly. 18 Here, α 16 However, if externalities across consumers, such as network externalities and congestion, exist, then an increase in aggregate output would be no longer a necessary condition, as implied by Adachi (2002 Adachi ( , 2005 , who studies monopoly with linear demands. See also Czerny and Zhang (2015) as a recent study of price discrimination and congestion. 18 This is because
19 Conceptually, the market power index defined here corresponds to what is called the conduct parameter when market power itself is a target of estimation without an exact specification of strategic intreracion (see, e.g., Bresnahan 1989; Genesove and Mullin 1998; and Corts 1999) .
20 Alternatively, Weyl and Fabinger (2013, p. 531) and Adachi and Fabinger (2019) define the market power index in a market (which, in our interest in price discrimination, can be indexed by m) by
is the aggregate diversion ratio (Shapiro 1996) 
Here, A m (p) measures the intensity of rivalness: if A m (p) is close to one, consumers who leave a firm as a response to an increase in its price are nearly all switching to its rival's product. In this way, Aguirre, Cowan and Vickers' (2010) derivation in the case of monopoly (where the method by Schmalensee (1981) is utilized) is connected to Weyl and Fabinger's (2013) condition in the case of symmetric oligopoly. In particular, Aguirre, Cowan and Vickers' (2010, p. 1606 ) Proposition 2 (a sufficient condition for price discrimination to raise social welfare) is extended to the case of oligopoly in a simpler manner, using the concept of pass-through introduced in the next subsection.
As Weyl and Fabinger (2013, p. 544) 
almost of all consumers who leave a firm as a response to its price increase are switching to other rivals' products), then θ m becomes close to zero irrespective of the value of the markup rate. Thus, θ m (p), which ranges between 0 and 1, better captures the brand stickiness than L m (p) does.
(their mc and ε D are replaced by our c m and ε I m , respectively) as the Lerner index adjusted by the elasticity of the industry's demand. If the first-order condition is given for each market (that is, if full price discrimination is allowed), then θ m (p) defined as in Weyl and Fabinger (2013) 
is established. 21 Even if the firms' products have the same characteristics across different markets (with no product differentiation), the extent of brand loyalty may differ across markets, reflecting differences in market characteristics (summarized in demand functions).
22 Now, we consider the effects of price discrimination on aggregate output. First, note that
. 
Now, suppose that the brand stickiness in the weak market is so weak that θ w (p w ) is close to zero (θ w (p w ) ≈ 0), whereas the brand stickiness in the strong market is moderate or strong (θ s (p s ) 0). Then, the left hand side of inequality (2) above is approximated by
, the left hand side becomes infinitely negative as θ w (p w ) approaches to zero (assuming the first term is bounded). Counterintuitively, in the weak market, where price discrimination lowers the price, the brand rivalness has a negative effect on an increase in aggregate output by price discrimination. This is because the uniform price is already very low due to the fierce level of competition and thus there is little room for a price reduction by price discrimination to increase the output in the weak market. The opposite argument holds if the strong market is characterized by a low brand stickiness (i.e., θ s (p s , c s ) ≈ 0). This implies that, as expected, a fierce level of competition in the strong market has a positive effect on an increase in aggregate output by price discrimination. The rivalness in the strong market keeps the price increase by price discrimination small, and thus a reduction in output in the strong market is also kept small.
Following Holmes (1989) , we call the first and the second terms in the left hand side of inequality (2) the adjusted-concavity part, and the third and the fourth terms the elasticityratio part:
Consider the adjusted-concavity part. A larger α F w and/or a smaller α C w make a positive Q (r) more likely. A larger α F w means that the firm's own part of the demand in the weak market (∂x A,w /∂p A ) is more convex ("the output expansion effect"). On the other hand, a smaller α C w means that how many of the firm's customers switch to the rival's product as response to the firm's price increase is not so much affected by the current price level ("the countervailing effect"). In this sense, the strategic concerns in the firm's pricing are small. Thus, both a larger α 
We assume that h m is decreasing (and call it the Decreasing Inverse Ratio Condition; DIRC).
23
It is also shown that
Then, there exists r such that Q ( r) = 0 and 
2 . Thus, the DIRC states that the profit function, starting from the zero price, increases quickly, attaining the optimal price, and the decreases slowly as p becomes larger and larger beyond the optimum. In this way, the optimal price is reached "close" enough to the zero price, rather than "still climbing up" even far away from it. To see this, if q m > 0, then it is necessary to assume π m > 0. This means that π m , which is negative, should be larger, that is, the negative slope of π m should be gentler, as p increases. If q m ≤ 0, then π m should be, whether it is positive or negative, sufficiently large. In either case, as p increases, π m increases quickly below the optimum, and decreases slowly beyond it.
24 This is because the modified version of Aguirre, Cowan and Vickers' (2010, p.1605) Lemma also holds in our oligopoly setting.
[Q(r * ) − Q(0)]/2 < 0; price discrimination lowers aggregate output.
If
(a) is monotonically increasing (if Q (r * ) > 0, this is true), and as a result, ∆Q/2 > 0;
price discrimination raises aggregate output.
(b) first increases, and then after the reaching the maximum (where Q (r) = 0), decreases until r = r * . In this case, price discrimination may raise or lower aggregate output:
it cannot be determined whether ∆Q/2 < 0 or ∆Q/2 > 0 without further functional and/or parametric restrictions. Now, we determine the sign of Q (0). It follows that sign[
holds, the following proposition obtains.
Proposition 1. Given the DIRC, if θ s > θ w and
then price discrimination lowers aggregate output. If θ * w > θ * s and
then price discrimination raises aggregate output.
Proof. See Appendix, part B.
It is seen that this proposition is a generalization of Aguirre, Cowan, and Vickers' (2010, p. 1609) Proposition 4, (i) and (ii). If θ s and θ w are sufficiently close to one (i.e., monopoly) under either uniform pricing or price discrimination, then inequality (5) is approximated by α 
because the first-order condition with q indicates dp *
25 Note here that q m /π m = θ * m · ρ * m , which implies that from equality (3),
Summarizing these arguments, we obtain the following proposition.
Proposition 2. Given the DIRC, if θ * w ρ * w ≥ θ * s ρ * s holds, the price discrimination raises aggregate output. Conversely, if
holds, then price discrimination lowers aggregate output.
As stated above, θ * m ρ * m is interpreted as quantity pass-through under price discrimination in market m if the marginal cost is constant. Thus, the first part of the proposition simply claims 25 Note that this is the case where dq * m d q is evaluated at q = 0: Miklós-Thal and Shaffer (2019b) derive a general formula for q > 0, correcting Weyl and Fabinger's (2013) arguments. If the marginal costs are non-constant,
should be considered, where c m (·) is the cost function, and thus θ * m ρ * m is no longer the quantity pass-through under price discrimination (that is, when q = 0). See Weyl and Fabinger (2013, p. 572 ) for a precise expression of quantity pass-through with non-constant marginal costs. that aggregate output is raised by price discrimination if the marginal reduction in quantity caused by a small deviation from price discrimination in the market where price discrimination raises output (i.e., the weak market) is larger than the marginal increase in quantity in the strong market. The second part describes the opposite case, although it does not permit a direct comparison because pass-through is not defined market-wise unless the pricing regime is "perfect" or "full" price discrimination (i.e., r = r * ), where the first-order conditions are given market-wise. Note that if |π m | is small, then π m is "flat," and thus the price shift |∆p m | in response to some change would be large. Hence, the role of π w /π s is to adjust measurement units for ρ w /ρ s . For example, if |π w | is very small, then the ρ w is "over represented," and thus it should be "penalized" so that right hand side of the inequality in the proposition becomes small.
Social Welfare
Now, we study the effects of allowing third-degree price discrimination on social welfare. To proceed further, note that
We follow Aguirre, Cowan, and Vickers (2010, p. 1605) , who define z m (p) ≡ (p−c m )q m (p)/π m (p), which is "the ratio of the marginal effect of a price increase on social welfare to the second derivative of the profit function." However, our q m and π m have strategic effects. More specifically, our q m and π m are written as
As in Aguirre, Cowan, and Vickers (2010, p. 1605) , we can write
and their lemma also holds in our case of oligopoly if we assume z m is increasing (the Increasing Ratio Condition; IRC).
26 It is also shown that
Then, as (1/2)Q(r) does, (1/2)W (r) behaves on [0, r * ] in either manner:
is monotonically decreasing in r, and as a result ∆W/2 = [W (r * ) − W (0)]/2 < 0; price discrimination lowers social welfare.
If
(a) is monotonically increasing (if W (r * ) > 0, this is true), and as a result, ∆W/2 > 0;
price discrimination raises social welfare.
(b) first increases, and then after the reaching the maximum (where W (r) = 0), decreases until r = r * . In this case, price discrimination may raise or lower social welfare: it cannot be determined whether ∆W/2 < 0 or ∆W/2 > 0 without further functional and/or parametric restrictions. Now, we determine the sign of W (0). First, define the markup in market m by
, and thus, the following proposition is obtained.
Proposition 3. Given the IRC, if the markup in strong market relative to the weak market at the uniform price p is sufficiently large, i.e.,
then price discrimination lowers social welfare.
If there are no strategic effects (i.e., ∂x Bm /∂p 
On the other hand, if there are no cost differentials (i.e., c s = c w ≡ c), then inequality (7) above reduces to π w (p)/q w (p) ≥ π s (p)/q s (p) because the markups are the same in the two markets. Thus, if there are no strategic effects and no cost differentials, then inequality (7) coincides with Aguirre, Cowan and Vickers' (2010, p. 1605 
. That is, the firm's "direct demand function in the strong market is at least as convex as that in the weak market at the nondiscriminatory price" (Aguirre, Cowan and Vickers 2010, p. 1602) .
Recall that in our case of oligopoly, equality (4) holds, which leads to the following corollary, another expression for the sufficient condition for price discrimination to lower social welfare in the case of no cost differentials. 
This is because
. Now, using market power, markup, and pass-through, we obtain the following sufficient conditions for price discrimination to raise or lower social welfare. 
holds, then price discrimination lowers social welfare.
Proof. See Appendix, part C.
Roughly speaking, if either (i) market power (θ), (ii) markup (µ), or (iii) pass-through (ρ) is sufficiently small in the strong market, then social welfare is likely to be higher under price discrimination. In particular, if these three measures are calculated (or estimated) in each separate market, then it would assist one to judge whether price discrimination is desirable from a society's viewpoint. As explained above, if the marginal costs are constant, θ * m ρ * m is interpreted as quantity pass-through: µ * m × θ * m ρ * m approximates the trapezoid generated by a small deviation from (perfect) price discrimination that captures the marginal welfare gain in the strong market and the marginal welfare loss in the weak market. If the latter is larger than the former, such a deviation lowers social welfare, and owing to the IRC, this argument extends globally so that the regime switch to uniform pricing definitely lowers social welfare. Note that this comparison will be a little bit more involved when starting at uniform pricing for the same reason as explained after Proposition 2.
Even if there are no cost differentials (i.e., c s = c w ), this expression cannot be further simplified. In other words, this expression is already robust to the inclusion of cost differentials. Now, if we further assume that there are no strategic effects (i.e., θ m = 1), then the above condition becomes (p * Aguirre, Cowan and Vickers (2010, p. 1606) , where σ I m (q) ≡ −qp /p is the curvature of the industry's inverse demand function (in symmetric pricing), because it is shown that ρ * m = 1/(2 − σ * m ) in our oligopoly setting as well. Thus, price discrimination raises social welfare "if the discriminatory prices are not far apart and the inverse demand function in the weak market is locally more convex than that in the strong market" (Aguirre, Cowan and Vickers 2010, p. 1602) .
This proposition also has the following attractive feature. Suppose that price discrimination is being conducted. Then, to evaluate it from a viewpoint of social welfare, one only needs the local information: first, θ * m , µ * m and ρ * m for each m = s, w, are computed, and if the sufficient condition above is satisfied, then the ongoing price discrimination is justified. In addition, to compute θ * m , µ * m and ρ * m in equilibrium, information on the marginal cost is unnecessary: once a specific form of demand function in market m for firm j, q jm = x jm (p jm , p −j,m ) is provided (and if the IRC is satisfied), then the three variables are computed in the following manner:
Thus, if the firm's demand for each market m is estimated and the discriminatory price p * m is observed, then one can easily compute θ * m , µ * m , and ρ * m , using up to the second-order demand characteristics.
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To the best of our knowledge, this proposition is the most general statement on when allowing oligopolistic firms to price discriminate raises or lowers social welfare, allowing cost differentials as Chen and Schwartz (2015) and Chen, Li, and Schwartz (2019) . 29 It should be emphasized that the second-order supply property, i.e., the derivative of the marginal cost, would be necessary if non-constant marginal cost is allowed, as suggested by Adachi and Fabinger (2019) in the context of issues of general "taxation" (pure taxation and other additional costs from external changes). 
Parametric Examples
To consider the following parametric examples, we assume that there are two (strong and weak), and two symmetric firms.
Example 1: Linear Demands Linear demands are derived from the quadratic utility of the representative consumer in market m under symmetric product differentiation:
which yields linear inverse demands, p jm (q jm , q −j,m ) = ω m − β m q jm − γ m q −j,m , and the corresponding direct demand in market m is 
, which implies that the discriminatory price in market m satisfies: Figure 1 , the demand curve is depicted so that the ratio of (p m − c m ) to (ω m − p m ) takes almost the same value. However, in the left panel, the markup rate is high. This is mainly due to a low elasticity of the industry's demand rather than a low cross-price elasticity: the rivalness between brands may be sufficiently high. In the right panel, the markup rate is low. However, this does not necessarily mean that brands are in a strong rivalry. Instead, ε 
which implies that Q (r) > 0 if and only if δ s > δ w , that is, the firms' products are less differentiated in the strong market. Now, consider the sufficient condition for price discrimination to lower social welfare in Proposition 3: G(c s , c w ) ≥ 0, where
Similarly, consider the sufficient condition for price discrimination to raise social welfare in Proposition 4: H(c s , c w ) ≤ 0 where
In the case of linear demands with no product differentiation (i.e., monopoly: γ m = 0 and hence δ m = 0),
raise social welfare: in our notation, it is ω s − ω w ≤ 3(c s − c w ) (with γ s = 0 and γ w = 0). As Panel (a) in Figure 2 shows, our sufficient condition, c s ≥ c w , for price discrimination to raise social welfare in the case of monopoly is weaker than Chen and Schwartz' (2015, p. 454) necessary and sufficient condition. Under oligopoly, however, the (c s , c w ) region for sufficiency for ∆W ≥ 0, i.e, the region of H(c s , c w ) ≤ 0 is now smaller, whereas the region for sufficiency for ∆W ≤ 0, i.e, the region of G(c s , c w ) ≥ 0 becomes larger (Panel b). In this numerical example, the line of c w = c s is included in the region of G(c s , c w ) ≥ 0; price discrimination lowers social welfare when the marginal costs are common across markets. However, it is possible that social welfare is higher under price discrimination in this case, more specifically, if δ s ≡ γ s /β s is sufficiently higher than δ w ≡ γ w /β w , as shown in Figure 3 , where c s = c w = 0.2 and G and H are interpreted as G(δ s , δ w ) and H(δ s , δ w ), respectively. This example is consistent with Adachi and Matsushima's (2014, p.1239 ) Proposition 1 (and their Figures 4 and 5) with an additional result: here, the sufficient condition for ∆W ≤ 0 is also included, whereas their Proposition 1 establishes a necessary and sufficient condition for ∆W > 0 in the case of linear demands.
Example 2: Logit Demands In each market m = 1, 2, firm j faces the following market share:
where ω m > 0 is now the product-specific utility and β m > 0 is the responsiveness of the representative consumer in market m to the price. 
. Both p * m and q * m should be jointly solved numerically. Now, it is shown that w to be actually lower than p * s , c w , relative to c s , must be sufficiently small. Specfically, the region of (c s , c w ) is restricted to the area below the dashed thick line in the upper left. In each panel, the dashed line corrresponds to Chen and Schwarz' (2015) thereshold for the necessity and sufficiency for ∆W ≥ 0 in the case of monopoly. The region for H ≤ 0 is the area below line hh. In panel (a), the region for G ≥ 0 is the area between the dashed thick line and line c s = c w , whereas it is the area between the dashed thick line and line gg in panel (b). Figure 2 , the region of (δ s , δ w ) is restricted to the area above the dashed thick line in the lower right for p * s to be actually higher than p * w . The region for H ≤ 0 is the area between the dashed thick line and line hh, whereas the region for G ≥ 0 is the area above line gg. 
because (ε
Note here that in contrast to the linear demand, the two curvatures are positive: (α
That is, the logit demand is convex in both own and cross directions.
It is also verified that
where, with α m (p) ≡ β m p[1 − 2q m (p)] being the common value for the curvatures,
The equilibrium uniform price p = p(c, ω, β) satisfies
which should also be numerically solved. Here, to see the role of the demand curvatures, we study the region of (β s , β w ), with a fixed value of c s = c w = 0.2. Figure 4 shows that a higher value of β w , relative to β s , that is, a higher degree of convexity in the weak market, is associated with a negative change in social welfare by price discrimination. This result firstly appears not to be consistent with Aguirre, Cowan, and Vickers (2010) , who emphasize that as the demand in the weak market becomes more convex, it is more likely that price discrimination raises social welfare because a larger increase in output in the weak market offsets the misallocation effect due to price discrimination. However, Aguirre, Cowan, and Vickers' (2010) result holds if the demand in the strong market is concave. Here, the demand in the strong market is also convex. In this case, the uniform price is kept relatively low; thus an introduction of price discrimination again highlights the misallocation effect. Figures 2 and 3 , the region of (β s , β w ) is restricted to the area above the dashed thick curve in the lower right for p * s to be actually higher than p * w . The region for G ≥ 0 is the area above curve gg, whereas the region for H ≤ 0 is the area between the dashed thick curve and curve hh. 
Consumer Surplus
One can extend the analysis above to study consumer surplus. First, consumer surplus is defined by replacing c m in W (r) by p m (r) to define
which implies that
where
If g m is assumed to be decreasing, then one can use a similar argument. We call this condition the Decreasing Marginal Consumer Loss Condition (DMCLC). price discrimination raises consumer surplus.
(b) first increases, and then after the reaching the maximum (where CS (r) = 0), decreases until r = r * . In this case, price discrimination may raise or lower consumer surplus: it cannot be determined whether ∆CS/2 < 0 or ∆CS/2 > 0 without further functional and/or parametric restrictions.
Thus, we determine the sign of CS (0). it follows that sign[
2 /q m , that is q m is not "too convex," then the DMCLC is a sufficient condition for the DIRC to hold. Thus, under this "not too convex" assumption, the relationship, "DMCLC ⇒ DIRC ⇒ IRC", holds.
Proposition 5. Given the DMCLC, if the output in the weak market at the uniform price p is sufficiently large, i.e.,
then price discrimination lowers consumer surplus.
Then, using markup and pass-through, we can rewrite equality (8) as
for r < r * , and
for r = r * which immediately leads to the following proposition.
Proposition 6. Given the DMCLC, if µ * w ρ * w ≥ µ * s ρ * s holds, then price discrimination raises consumer surplus. Conversely, if
holds, then price discrimination lowers consumer surplus.
Alternatively, it is also possible to directly apply Cowan's (2012) analysis of the effects of monopolistic third-degree price discrimination on consumer surplus to our case of oligopoly. From Cowan's (2012, p. 338) inequality (5), the lower and the upper bounds for a change in consumer surplus, ∆CS, are given by
,
respectively, where M R m is the "virtual" marginal cost with which the uniform price p coincides with the equilibrium discriminatory price when no uniform pricing restriction is imposed.
Non-constant Marginal Costs
Notice that our results so far do not crucially depend on the assumption of constant marginal costs. The only caveat is the definition of pass-through: to properly define pass-through in 29 accommodation with non-constant marginal costs, we introduce a small amount of unit tax t m > 0 in market m: the firm's first-order derivative of the profit with respect to its own price (equality 1) is now replaced by
where mc m = c m [q m (p)] is the marginal cost at q m (p). Then, pass-through is defined by ρ m ≡ ∂pm ∂tm
, and no other changes should be made to derive the results above. In fact, the usefulness of pass-through is that it can easily be accommodated with non-constant marginal costs (Weyl and Fabinger 2013; Fabinger and Weyl 2018; and Adachi and Fabinger 2019 ). An additional caveat is that θ * m ρ * m is no longer interpreted as quantity pass-through under price discrimination (Weyl and Fabinger 2013, p. 572) : one needs to take into account the "elasticity of the marginal cost" to approximate the trapezoids of the welfare gain and loss by a deviation from (full) price discrimination.
Firm Heterogeneity
In this section, we argue that the main thrusts under firm symmetry also hold when heterogeneous firms are introduced. Without loss of generality, we keep considering one strong market and one weak market: as explained in Footnote 15 above, an extension to the case of more than two markets is conceptually straightforward. We assume Corts' (1998, p. 315 ) best response symmetry: all firms agree on which market is strong and which market is weak. The case of best response asymmetry is studied by Corts (1998) (see also Footnote 8 above). The number of firms is N (≥ 2). Then, each firm j has the constraint, p js − p jw ≤ r j . Then, as above, firm j's equilibrium price in the weak market under all of these constraints is written as p jw (r), where r = (r 1 , r 2 , ..., r N ). Accordingly, firm j's equilibrium price in the strong market is p js (r) = p jw (r) + r j . Thus, the equilibrium price pair in market m = w, s is written as p m (r) = (p 1m (r), p 2m (r), ..., p N m (r)). Then, the social welfare is defined as a function of r:
T and c m = (c 1m , c 2m , ..., c N m ) T . Now, let r * j ≡ p * js − p * jw for each j = 1, 2, ..., N . Then, each firm's constraint is written as 0 ≤ r j = λr * j ≤ r * j , with λ ∈ [0, 1]. Using this, we re-define the functions of r as functions of one-dimensional variable, λ. In particular, the social welfare is written as: 
where T denotes transpose, and
T .
Now, we apply the implicit function theorem to f (p w , λ) = 0, where
is a collection of all firms' first-order conditions for profit maximization under regime λ, to obtain
, so that (K ≡ K(p) and H m ≡ H m (p), m = s, w, with p being the equilibrium uniform price when λ = 0), holds, then price discrimination lowers social welfare.
Proof. See Appendix, part D.
Note that for each j, Z * jm = N k=1 θ * km µ * km ρ * jkm , which is interpreted as the weighted sum of firm j's own pass-through (ρ * jjm ) and the collection of its cross pass-through (ρ * jkm , k = j). For aggregate output and consumer surplus, we can readily generalize our previous results to the case of firm heterogeneity in a similar manner. Table 1 summarizes our results for heterogeneous firms.
Concluding Remarks
This paper provides theoretical implications of oligopolistic third-degree price discrimination with general nonlinear demands, allowing cost differentials across separate markets. In this sense, this paper, with the help of the methodology proposed by Weyl and Fabinger (2013) , synthesizes Aguirre, Cowan, and Vickers' (2010) analysis of monopolistic third-degree price discrimination with general demands and Chen and Schwartz' (2015) analysis of monopolistic differential pricing and extends them to the case of differentiated oligopoly.
Our theoretical analysis, which takes into account firm heterogeneity, can also be utilized to empirically assess the welfare effects of third-degree price discrimination under oligopoly. In particular, in line with the "sufficient statistics" approach (Chetty 2009 ), our predictions regarding the welfare effects do not rely on functional specifications, and are thus considered fairly robust. In practice, one needs to specify demand and supply functions to estimate/calibrate such sufficient statistics as price elasticity, curvature, market power, and pass-through. In this sense, these sufficient statistics can take different values, depending on functional specifications. However, once numerical values of sufficient statistics are obtained, there should be no disagreement as to welfare assessment.
As such, our methodology would also be extended to an analysis of welfare effects of wholesale/input third-degree price discrimination (Katz 1987; DeGraba 1990; Yoshida 2000; Inderst and Valletti 2009; Villas-Boas 2009; Arya and Mittenforf 2010; Li 2014; O'Brien 2014; Gaudin and Lestage 2018; and Miklós-Thal and Shaffer 2019a) . To do so, one would need to properly define sufficient statistics at each stage of a vertical relationship. Another important issue is to consider multi-product oligopolistic firms.
32 What happens if price discrimination is allowed for some products, whereas uniform pricing is enforced for other products? These and other important issues related to third-degree price discrimination await further research. 
B. Proof of Proposition 1
First, note that if
, then price discrimination lowers aggregate output. The first part is a sufficient condition for this inequality to hold. .
C. Proof of Proposition 4
Note first that 
D. Proof of Proposition 7
First, the multi-dimensional version of the market power index is defined by (Weyl and Fabinger 2013, p. 552) :
. . . 
Thus, 
